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Abstract:   
Traditionally, the so-called ‘redintegration experiment’ is at the center of the comments on the supposed 
Boyle/Spinoza correspondence. A. Clericuzio argued (refuting the interpretation by R.A. & M.B. Hall) in his 
influential publications that, in De nitro, Boyle accounted for the ‘redintegration’ of saltpeter on the grounds of 
the chemical properties of corpuscles and did not make any attempt to deduce them from the mechanical 
principles.   
By contrast, this paper claims that with his De nitro Boyle wanted to illustrate and promote precisely his new 
Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy, and that he did significant attempts to explain the phenomena in terms 
of mechanical qualities. Boyle had borrowed the ‘redintegration experiment’ from R. Glauber and used it as a 
tool to prove that his philosophy was the right alternative for the Peripatetic and Paracelsian theory of qualities 
of bodies.      
Consequently, Clericuzio’s characterization of the Boyle/Spinoza controversy as a discussion between a strict 
mechanical philosopher and a chemist is problematic and should be revised.    
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Introduction2 
In October 1661, Henry Oldenburg (1618-1677) sent a Latin translation3 of “one of the most seminal” 
writings of Robert Boyle’s entire career to Spinoza (1632-1677). (Hunter 2009, p. 112) This was the 
start of an indirect correspondence between Boyle (1627-1691) and Spinoza. Central in Spinoza’s 
critical comments on Boyle’s Certain Physiological Essays (1661) and its interpretations in secondary 
literature is the so-called ‘redintegration’ experiment by which saltpeter (or niter) is decomposed and 
recomposed or ‘redintegrated’.  
In two influential publications, published in 1990 and 2000, Antonio Clericuzio presented his views 
on the supposed Boyle/Spinoza controversy, arguing that the contrast between the Dutch philosopher 
                                                          
1 F.A.A. Buyse, visiting research fellow at the Descartes Centre, Utrecht University, Drift 6, 3512 BS Utrecht, 
The Netherlands, E-mail: f.a.a.buyse@gmail.com   
2 In this article I use the following abbreviations:  WOB = Works of Robert Boyle. Edited by Michael Hunter 
and Edward B. Davis and CWS = The Collected Works of Spinoza, Edited and translated by Edwin Curley.  
3 The first published Latin translation was by Gilbert Havers. This quarto edition was registered by the 
publisher, Henry Herringman, on 13 June 1661. However, in the late 1650s a Latin translation had been 
prepared by Henry Strubbe. The first published version of the English text had been registered by the same 
publisher under the title “A Proemiall Essay” on 29 October 1660 and on 28 April 1661 under the title “Certain 
Physiological Essays”.  (Hunter, WOB, vol. II, xiii-XV). 
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and the author of The Sceptical Chymist (1661) is not about an opposition between the rationalist 
versus empirical philosophy - as A.R. and M.B. Hall (1964) had argued before him - but on the role of 
mechanical explanations in chemistry.  According the Italian historian, Spinoza’s “corpuscular 
philosophy” is “strictly mechanical and reductionistic”; whereas Boyle “accounted for the 
‘redintegration’ on the grounds of the chemical properties of corpuscles and did not make any attempt 
to deduce them from the mechanical principles.”  (Clericuzio 2000, p.139 and 141) 
This paper contests this view.  Firstly, it demonstrates that, with his De nitro, Boyle wanted to 
illustrate and promote in the first place the plausibility of a new philosophy, the Corpuscular 
Philosophy or Mechanical Philosophy, thereby attempting to unite atomists and Cartesians in one 
common prestigious project. Moreover, this paper claims that the redintegration experiment as such - 
which was indeed at the center of Spinoza’s comments - was not essential from Boyle’s point of view. 
The redintegration of saltpeter was in fact only a tool to illustrate the plausibility of his new 
philosophy which he introduced in Certain Physiological Essays and would promote for the rest of his 
life in other subsequent works such as The origine of formes and qualities, (according to the 
corpuscular philosophy)4 (1666-67), About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis 
(1674) and Mechanical Origin of Qualities (1675). 
Additionally, this paper argues that Johan Rudolf Glauber (1604-1670) – who is completely absent in 
Clericuzio’s interpretation - needs to be included in the discussion of the context of the Spinoza/Boyle 
correspondence. This paper highlights that the redintegration was not executed for the first time by 
Boyle. In fact, this was an experiment of Glauber whose work was known to Boyle. Consequently, the 
Anglo-Irish natural philosopher might have borrowed Glauber’s experiment to show the potential of 
his prestigious project which had to replace the peripatetic doctrine of qualities and the one of the 
“chymists” based on Paracelsus’s ideas. Moreover, this paper argues that Glauber’s work was not 
only known to Boyle but probably also to Spinoza whose birthplace was only a stone’s throw from the 
well-known lab of the German alchemist/chemist.   
In the third section, this paper compares Boyle, Spinoza’s and Glauber’s interpretation of the 
redintegratio experiment.  Finally, it is shown - based on Boyle’s definition of Mechanical 
Philosophy and Spinoza’s interest in alchemy - that it is, for several reasons, very problematic to 
categorize Spinoza as a radical philosopher whose corpuscular philosophy was strictly mechanical 
and reductionistic, as Clericuzio5 does repeatedly.  
 
                                                          
4 The full title of this work is: “The origine of formes and qualities, (according to the corpuscular philosophy) 
illustrated by considerations and experiments (written formerly by way of notes upon an essay about nitre) by ... 
Robert Boyle ...”.  
5  See for instance: Clericuzio, 2000, p. 135 and 139. 
Dr. Filip A.A. Buyse 
Boyle and Spinoza on a different wavelength: Robert Boyle’s aim 
 
a. The context of the Boyle/Spinoza correspondence  
        
Back in London, after his visit to Spinoza in Rijnsburg during the summer of 1661, Henry Oldenburg 
wrote to Spinoza to invite him to maintain contact. In this first letter already, the German immigrant 
mentioned a newly published book by an English nobleman. And a few months later, he sent the Latin 
translation of Robert Boyle’s Certain Physiological Essays6, entitled Tentamina quaedam 
physiologica diversis temporibus et occasionibus conscripta, to the Dutch philosopher asking for his 
critical comments. The German immigrant and friend of Robert Boyle, clarified that he was especially 
interested in his views on the experiments which were explained in the book. Spinoza accepted 
Oldenburg’s invitation and gave his critical comments in his longest existing letter, Letter 6, dated 
April 1662. This letter is part of the so-called Boyle/Spinoza correspondence which consists of two 
letters of Spinoza [Letter 6 (1661) and Letter 13 (1663)] and two of Oldenburg/Boyle [Letter 11 
(1663) and Letter 16 (1663)]. This correspondence between Spinoza and Boyle was however never 
direct but always indirect via Henry Oldenburg7. In his first letter of the Boyle/Spinoza controversy, 
Spinoza gave much attention to the so-called redintegration experiment with saltpeter. Boyle had 
explained this experiment in a treatise entitled De nitro which he had included as the fourth of the five 
treatises of his Certain Physiological Essays, which has the following structure:  
1. A Proemial Essay 
2. Two Essays concerning the Unsuccessfulness of Experiments, etc. 
3. Some specimens of an Attempt to make Chymical Experiments useful to illustrate the notions of the 
Corpuscular Philosophy.  
a. A physical-chymical Essay containing An Experiment with considerations touching the 
different Parts and Redintegration of SALT-PETRE.  




b. Boyle and Spinoza on a different wavelength 
 
In his letter of 3 April 1663, Oldenburg thanks Spinoza for his critical comments. However, before he 
deals with the matter, he advises Spinoza – on behalf of Robert Boyle – to have the real purpose of the 
                                                          
6 The second edition of Boyle’s Certain Physiological Essays is included in: WOB, II, p. 3-203.  
7 The correspondence between Baruch Spinoza and Henry Oldenburg is composed of 17 letters from Oldenburg 
to Spinoza and 10 from Spinoza to Oldenburg. These letters are written between 1661 and 1676. The ‘Spinoza-
Boyle’ correspondence forms a part of this larger whole. 
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“Chemical-Physical Treatise” in mind8.  In the second paragraph of his second and final letter of the 
Boyle/Spinoza correspondence, dated 4 August 1663 (Letter 16), Oldenburg asks Spinoza once again 
“to understand the true goal he [Boyle] had set himself in that Work” and insists that Spinoza read the 
preface9 of Some specimen of an Attempt wherein he had explained extensively the true aim of his 
work:  
He [Robert Boyle] asks you to consult the Preface to his Experiments on Niter, to understand the true goal he 
had set himself in that Work: to show that the teachings of a more solid Philosophy, which is now appearing 
again, can be illustrated by clear experiments, and that these [experiments] can be explained very well without 
the forms, qualities and futile elements of the Schools. But he did not at all take it on himself to teach the nature 
of Niter nor even to reject what anyone can maintain about the homogeneity of matter and about the differences 
of bodies arising only from motion, shape, etc. He says he had only wished to show that the various textures of 
bodies produce their various differences, that from these proceed quite different effects, and that so long as the 
resolution to prime matter has not been accomplished, Philosophers and others rightly infer some heterogeneity 
from this. I should not think that there is any fundamental difference between you and Mr. Boyle here10. 
 
In sum, Boyle repeatedly makes clear to Spinoza - via Oldenburg - that he was missing the point 
completely. What was at stake for Boyle was not the examination of the nature of Saltpeter nor the 
analyses of the redintegration experiment as such, but the promotion of a new philosophy:  The 
Corpuscular Philosophy, a term which he preferred to ‘Mechanical Philosophy’.   
The supposed controversy between Boyle and Spinoza has been interpreted by several scholars such 
as Henri Daudin as an opposition between the philosopher/metaphysician [“le philosophe 
métaphysicien”] Spinoza and the experimenter/ technician [“l’expérimentateur, le technician”] 
Robert Boyle. (Daudin 1949) But, surprisingly, the early scientist Robert Boyle himself insists here 
that the philosopher Spinoza be less scientific and technical and much more philosophical in his 






c. Boyle’s aim  
 
As shown in the paragraph above, Boyle wanted Spinoza to have the aim of his work in mind.  But 
what was the aim of Robert Boyle to which Oldenburg referred repeatedly? The answer to this 
                                                          
8 CWS, I, 197. 
9 WOB, 2, 85-91.  
10 CWS, I, 216-218. 
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question is found in the preface that precedes De nitro in Certain Physiological Essays. In this 
polemic text, he reveals that he wants to replace the Peripatetic theory of qualities of bodies and 
theories based on the idea of Paracelsus (1493/94-1541) with his own new natural philosophy which 
he introduced here for the first time in his career11. 
Not only in this preface but also in other texts, written much later, he argues that his mechanical 
hypothesis provides a simpler and more compelling explanation for more natural phenomena  (Hunter 
2009, 116). Furthermore, he claimed that this could be illustrated by clear experiments which could be 
explained without the unintelligible substantial forms, real qualities and “futile elements of the 
Schools”. 
Interestingly, in the same preface he gives a precise definition of his new philosophy, introducing the 
term ‘Mechanical Philosophy’ into the English language which at the time the term sounded still very 
odd in all European languages and in Latin:  
That both parties agree in deducing all the Phaenomena of Nature from Matter and Local motion; I 
esteem‘d that notwithstanding those things wherein the Atomists and the Cartesians differ’d, they might be 
thought to agree in the main, and their Hypotheses might by a Person of a reconciling Disposition be look’d on 
as, upon the matter, one Philosophy.  Which because it explicates things by  Corpuscles, or minute Bodies, may 
(not very unfitly) be call’d Corpuscular;  though I sometimes stile it the Phoenician Philosophy, because some 
ancient Writers inform us, that not only before Epicurus and Democritus, but ev’n before Leucippus taught in 
Greece, a Phoenician Naturalist [Moschus] was wont to give an account of the Phaenomena of Nature by the 
Motion and other Affections of the minute Particles of Matter. Which because they are obvious and very 
powerfull in mechanical Engines, I sometimes also term it the Mechanical Hypothesis or Philosophy12.  
 
In this definition we can distinguish seven key elements13.  First of all, the study-object of the 
mechanical philosophy is nature and all natural phenomena (Element 1).  Indeed, the redintegration 
that was an experiment with salt-peter was in fact an instrument to show something which is true for 
all bodies. As Boyle reveals already in the first section of his De nitro, salt-peter was in his view a 
paradigmatic example for all bodies. In this section, he writes that  “Salt -peter is sold in the shops” 
and “it is to be found in so great a number of Compound Bodies, Vegetable, Animal, and even 
Mineral, that it seems to us to be only one of the  of the most Catholick of Salts, but so considerable 
an Ingredient of many sublunary concretes, that we may justly suppose it may well deserve our 
serious enquires, since the knowledge of it may be very conductive to the discovery of the Nature of 
several other bodies, and to the improvement of divers parts of Natural Philosophy.”14 Obviously this 
phrase echoes the views on salt-peter of the alchemist R. Glauber, who had already written 
extensively on salt-peter, to which we will come back later.  
                                                          
11 WOB, 2, 87. 
12 WOB, 2, 87. 
13 For a more detailed discussion of this definition see, for instance:  Buyse, 2010 and Buyse, 2013. 
14 WOB, 2, 93. 
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Secondly, there are only “two grand and most Catholic principles” as Boyle put it:  matter and motion, 
or more precisely: passive matter and local motion. (Element 2).  Therefore, Boyle argued that his 
natural philosophy was much more economical than the Peripatetic hypotheses which had 4 elements 
and the Paracelsian one which had three.  Thirdly, the new philosophy explains the natural 
phenomena in terms of mechanical affections15 such as motion, size and shape. (Element 3) It is 
important, however, to notice that the definition does not only create a primary/secondary distinction 
between the mechanical qualities and the secondary qualities16 but also between the macro and the 
microworld (Element 4) since according to this definition the phenomena do not have to be explained 
in terms of the mechanical properties of the bodies but in terms of the mechanical properties of the 
corpuscles that compose these bodies (Element 5).  Obviously, Boyle was inspired here by the 
atomism of Epicurus, Democritus and Leucippus as he indicates in his definition.  Additionally, Boyle 
adds the analogy of the mechanical machine to clarify his views17. (Element 6) Oldenburg had already 
written in his Letter 3 (27 September 1661) to Spinoza that in his “Philosophical Group” they were 
much “occupied with putting together a History of the Mechanical Arts” for they regarded “it as 
settled that the forms and qualities of things can best be explained on Mechanical Principles, that all 
nature’s effects are produced by motion, shape, and texture, and their various combinations, …”18   
Finally, the epistemological status of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy is that of a 
hypothesis that had to be validated experimentally. (Element 7) As we will see further in this article, 
this last element will constitute a significant difference between the views of Boyle and those of 
Spinoza. Boyle did choose the word ‘hypothesis’ very carefully since he wrote in the same period a 
treatise on “The Requisites of a Good Hypothesis” of which only fragments survive.  In this work, he 
argues that the first requisite of a good hypothesis it that it is intelligible.  
 
In sum, as the title “Some specimens of an Attempt to make Chymical Experiments useful to illustrate 
the notions of the Corpuscular Philosophy” of the third of his Certain Physiological Essays had 
suggested, Boyle wanted with the redintegration experiment to illustrate the plausibility of his 
corpuscular philosophy. That De nitro should really be understood in the context of Boyle’s new 
philosophy of bodies is also confirmed by what he would write in a work which he started to write in 
the same period but would only publish in 1686 entitled A Free Enquiry. In this metaphysical work he 
criticizes the scholastics who call the substantial forms and real qualities ‘semi-substantia’. When 
reflecting, he speaks about De nitro as ‘A Chemico-Physical Essay about Salt-petre’, against the 
                                                          
15 Boyle calls the primary properties of corpuscles in his “Of the Imperfecion of the Chymist’s Doctrine of 
Qualities” ‘corpuscularian Principles’. See WOB, 8, 401. 
16 See also section XII of De nitro: WOB, 2, 98. 
17 See also WOB, 8, 399. 
18 CWS, I, 169-170. 
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pretended origin and inexplicable nature of the imaginary substantial forms of the Peripatetics (Boyle 
1996, p.61). 
Clericuzio cannot think of a reason why Boyle should have appealed to the redintegration process in  
defence of his Mechanical Philosophy. However, there is an obvious reason. Indeed, as Michael 
Hunter put it (Hunter 2009, p. 116), with his experiment Boyle thought he could show that all 
substances in general, and saltpeter in particular, are composed of distinct parts which differ from the 
original substance, since they could “taken apart and put back together mechanically” as a machine, 
e.g. a pendulum clock.  After all, that’s why the Anglo-Irish natural philosopher uses the term 
‘Mechanical Philosophy’ as a synonym for ‘Corpuscular Philosophy’ referring to the Greek word for 
‘instrument’ or ‘machine’. Moreover, as his definition prescribed, Boyle could explain the 
phenomenon in a multi-realizable way so to speak; without assuming different basic stuffs. The 
phenomenon could be explained as a decomposition and synthesis or in other words a rearrangement 
of parts composed of the same basic inert material.  Like with clocks the differences between bodies 
was conceived very fundamentally as a difference in motion, size, form and arrangement of parts of 
the bodies.   
One of the basic elements of this new philosophy was the doctrine of qualities of bodies (element 3, 4 
and 5). Clericuzio argues that “It is noticeable that in Certain Physiological Essays Boyle does not 
make any attempt to deduce these sensible qualities [tastes and colours] from the shape or size of the 
corpuscles of the substances in question.” (Clericuzio, 1990, 575). However, this is precisely what 
Boyle intends (“I shall …”) to do in Section XII, just after his explanation of the experiment itself. 
Obviously, Boyle wants to demonstrate in the next sections that all sensible phenomena that go 
together with the experiment can be explained in terms of primary qualities of the corpuscles:  
The reflections which may be made on this Experiment are more than I have either the skill or leisure to 
prosecute, and therefore I shall content my self to present you very succinctly with a few of those that do the 
most readily occur to my present thoughts. 
And first, this Experiment seems to afford us an instance by which we may discern that Motion, Figure, and 
Disposition of parts, and such like primary and mechanical Affections (if I may call them) of Matter, may 
suffice to produce those more secondary affections of Bodies which are wont to be called Sensible Qualities19.  
 
It is noticeable that he introduces in this citation the primary/secondary terminology into the English 
language for the first time, after he had introduced “Mechanical Philosophy” in his preface (a 
terminology which his student Locke would take over and integrate systematically in his own 
philosophy).  Interestingly, Boyle’s efforts to illustrate his theory of qualities are clearly reflected in 
the structure of his text, which attributes a separated section for each of the five senses starting with 
“The Tangible qualities” in section XIII:  
                                                          
19 WOB, 2, 98. 
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And to begin with the Tangible Qualities, as Heat and Cold; it is commonly held, that Salt-Petre is in operation a 
Cold Body, if not one of the coldest in the world 
[…]; and did in our Experiment produce such an heat, that I could scarcely endure to hold in my hand the Vial, 
wherein much lesse than an ounce of each was mix'd, though but leisurely and almost by drops: as if Heat were 
nothing but a various and nimble motion of the minute particles of Bodies. For in our Experiment, as long as 
that confus'd agitation lasted, so long the heat endur'd, and with that agitation it / encreas'd and abated; and at 
length when the motion ceas'd, the heat also vanish'd20. 
In Section XIV, Boyle tries to explain sound in mechanical terms as the effect of  “swift and irregular 
motions of the particles of the Liquors”:  
This sound seem'd to proceed from the nimble and smart percussions of the ambient air, made by the swift and 
irregular motions of the particles of the Liquors: And such a kind of sound, but much lowder, was produc'd by 
the impetuous eruptions of the halituous flames of the Salt-Petre upon the casting of a live coal upon it. 
And in section XV he continues arguing that a modification of the disposition of the parts produces 
new color effects:  
[…] That disposition of parts, whereby the light reflected to the eye, was so modify'd as to produce that colour 
being now alter'd. […]21 
And in Section XVI, Boyle clarifies that the agitation of corpuscles leads to a very strong and 
offensive smell.  
 
[…] Upon the mixture of these two Liquors there also obtrudes it self upon the Sense a very strong and 
offensive smell, proceeding from the Spirit of Petre; […] 
[…] But though the Nitrous Spirit have a very strong and unwelcome odour of it self, yet it is made much more 
offensive by being pour'd on its own fix'd Salt; for upon their conflict, the matter, being vehemently agitated, 
doth more copiously emit such stinking exhalations than before, and sendeth forth fumes manifestly discernable 
as well to the Eye as Nostrils. […]22  
 
 
Finally, in his explanation of taste of bodies, the primary affection of “forme” (“more perfect”, “not 
fully incorporated”, …) is decisive.  Furthermore, Boyle applies mechanical metaphors such as “a 
taste more sharp and perforating” to express how the taste is experienced:   
The tastes of these bodies are as differing as any of their other qualities: […] And though we must not conceal 
from you, that in our trial the redintegrated Salt-Petre had upon its first impression upon the tongue a taste more 
sharp and perforating (if I may so speak) than ordinary Nitre; yet that pungency may not improbably be 
supposed to have proceeded from Acid particles of the Spirit that were not yet duly incorporated with, but onely 
loosely adherent to; the more perfectly Nitrous parts, which afterwards discover’d it self upon the tongue. […]23   
In sum, contrary to Clericuzio’s claims, Boyle does try to explain qualities in mechanical terms. It 
makes sense to question whether he succeeds doing so convincingly, but it cannot be denied, that he 
makes a significant attempt.  
                                                          
20 WOB, 2, 99. 
21 WOB, 2, 100. 
22 WOB, 2, 101. 
23 WOB, 2, 101. 
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d. Spinoza’s reply to Boyle’s aim 
 
Spinoza pretends that he could hardly believe that Boyle had “no other object in his Treatise on Niter 
than to show the weak foundations of that childish and frivolous doctrine of Substantial Forms and 
Qualities.”24 Therefore, he clarifies, he had discussed in his first letter the nature of saltpeter and 
Boyle’s methodology.  In his view, the redintegration experiment was for two reasons - as a proof of 
the mechanical doctrine of qualities – completely redundant.  First of all, because Bacon (1561-1626) 
and later Descartes (1596-1650) had already adequately demonstrated that “all tangible qualities 
depend only on motion, shape, and remaining mechanical affections”25.  Secondly, he had a problem 
with the fact that Boyle presented his theory of qualities of bodies as hypotheses that had to be 
validated by scientific experiment.  In his view, these kinds of experiments didn’t prove anything. The 
reconstitution of Nitre was only an excellent experiment, he clarifies, “for investigating the very 
nature of nature when we first know the Mechanical Principles of Philosophy and that all variations of 
bodies happen according to the laws of Mechanics.”26 
By contrast, A. Clericuzio argued that Spinoza had no problems with Boyle’s experimental 
methodology. Moreover, the Italian historian argues that Spinoza even proposed additional 
experiments (Clericuzio 1990, p. 576-577). However, as Pierre Macherey (Macherey 1995, p.746-
756) had already pointed out in an extensive paper (which is not mentioned by the Italian historian) it 
is important to acknowledge that Spinoza made a strict distinction between scientific experimentation 
[experimentum] and ordinary experience [experientia vaga]27. According to the Dutch philosopher, 
the problem is not that experiments, such as the redintegration experiment, are scientific. On the 
contrary, Spinoza is of the opinion that they are they are not scientific enough. He remarks that Boyle 
should have weighed the substances and have applied mathematical reasoning, anticipating Lavoisier 
(1743-1794)28.  Moreover, per definition, in scientific experiments you try to control the 
circumstances which is in Spinoza’s view is an illusion since this controlling is too much based on 
sensible knowledge which is according to his theory of knowledge29 necessarily inadequate and 
necessarily leads to new inadequate ideas.  Instead, according to Spinoza, the starting point for all 
adequate knowledge in general and knowledge of the mechanical doctrine of qualities in particular is 
ordinary experience [experientia vaga].  He illustrates this very clearly with numerous examples in his 
                                                          
24 CWS, I, 208.  
25 Cf. CWS, I, 178. 
26 CWS, I, 210.  
27 This distinction that Spinoza makes here goes back to Bacon. Cf. The Emendation of the Intellect, 19 and 
Novum organum, I, 82.  For the relation between Bacon and Spinoza concerning the experimentum/experientia 
vaga distinction see also Gabbey, 1997, 172-180.   
28 Cf. CWS, I, 174.   
29 For Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, see: the second part of his Ethics.  
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letter to Boyle. Likewise, the “three quite easy experiments”30 that he proposes are  part of ordinary 
experience rather than of scientific experimentation: “I deny that that these things follow more clearly 
and evidently from the experiment than from readily available experiments […]”31. 
Spinoza’s reply to Boyle’s remarks concerning the aim of his work  are trustworthy given the fact that 
he had written already in one of his early writings (more precisely in Chapter VI of the second part of 
the Cogitata metaphysica) that he had at this moment already “shown that there is nothing in matter 
but mechanical constructions and operations.”32 Furthermore, he writes very similar things in his later 
work and correspondence which illustrates that his views on this subject were very stable throughout 
his life. For instance, in the appendix of the first part of the Ethics33, he writes that sensible qualities 
do not represent the bodies as they are in themselves, just as he had done this in his Letter 6 to Boyle, 
defending the idea that sensible qualities are affections of the body. In the Physical Interlude of the 
second part of the Ethics, he defines a body as a whole of parts which participate in the same relation 
of motion and rest.  And in his Letter 56 (1674) to Hugo Boxel he severely criticizes severely a whole 
philosophical tradition based on the ideas of Plato and Aristotle which explained natural phenomena 
based on “occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles contrived 
ghost and spirits, […]”34showing instead much sympathy for the ideas of “Epicurus, Democritus, or 
any of the Atomists, or defender of invisible particles” as Boyle had done in his definition of 
Mechanical philosophy.  
 
The redintegration experiment  
a. Glauber’s versus Boyle’s version   
Boyle describes in section XXVIII of his De nitro (which came out in English in March 1661 and in 
Latin in quarto in June of the same year) the redintegration experiment as follows: 
 
when Salt-Petre is distill’d, the volatile liquor and fix’d Salt into which it is reduc’d by the fire, are endowed 
with properties exceeding different both from each other, and from those of the undissipated Concrete: for the 
Spirit of Nitre is (as we formerly have observ’d) a kind of Acetum Minerale, and possesses the Common 
qualities to be met with in acid spirits as such; whereas the fix’d Nitre is of an Alkalizate nature, and participates 
the qualities belonging generally to lixiviate Salts; and Salt-petre it self is a peculiar sort of Salt, discriminated 
by distinct properties both from those Salts that are eminently acid […] and from those that are properly 
Alkalizate […] And whereas Salt-Petre it self is partly fix’d, and partly volatile, the acid Ingredients of it 
are altogether volatile, the Alkalizate fix’d. […]35  
                                                          
30 CWS, I, 174. 
31 CWS, I, 210.  
32 CWS, I, 325. 
33 CWS, I, 439-446. 
34 CWS, II, 423. 
35 WOB, 2, 105–106.  
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However, at that moment, Glauber had already written in the fourth part of his Prosperitatis 
germaniæ (1656-61) - which had been published in Latin in 1660, one year before Boyle would 
publish De nitro - the following:  
N.B. The acid Spirit of Niter doth not dissolve sulphureous subjects, but mercurials onely : Contrarywise, the fix 
Niter doth not seize upon mercurial subjects, but sulphureous ones; but the flame of Salt-peter performs both : 
which verily is wonderful, that things so unlike  should in some few hours time be extracted out of one and the 
same subject. For the corrosive Spirit prepared out of Salt-peter by Distillation, and likewise the fix Salt, are 
most bitter enemies to each other, which ruinating and flaying one another, and being dead, return agen unto that 
which they were afore, and partakes of both natures; which the Ancient Philosophers do clearly point out unto 
us by the Griffon, which is headed and winged like an eagle, and the hinder part of its Body like a Lyon, as we 
have mentioned more at large in foregoing third part of the Prosperity of Germany (Glauber 1689, 406). 
 
Clericuzio writes in Elements, Principles and Corpuscles (2000) that J.R. Glauber was “The most 
important and influential German chemist in the mid-seventeenth century” and that he “spent many 
years in the Netherlands and established laboratories both in Germany (Kissingen) and in 
Amsterdam.”. (Clericuzio, 200, 192) He does not mention Glauber in his writings on the 
Boyle/Spinoza controversy. However, obviously, the decomposition and recomposition of saltpeter is 
already described in the citation from Glauber’s work. Moreover, the conclusion that Boyle had made 
from this experiment – that one substance (niter) can be decomposed in two different substances 
which were fundamentally different from saltpeter and can subsequently be recombined into saltpeter 
is already in Glauber’s text.  Indeed, in the passage above the German alchemist argues highlights 
very clearly that “fix Niter” is very different from “the corrosive Spirit prepared out of Salt-peter by 
Distillation, and likewise the fix Salt, are most bitter enemies to each other”. Acid spirit and fixed 
niter are “two fightening and capital Enemies”, he continues, highlighting that in his view they were 
two very distinct substances (and different from saltpeter) with different qualities: the acid spirit of 
niter that does “not dissolve sulphureous subjects, but mercurial onely” and “fix niter doth not seize 
upon mercurial subjects, but sulphureous ones”.   
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Fig. 1: Extract from the original Latin version of the fourth part of Glauber’s Prosperitatis germaniæ (1656-61) 
which included the redintegration experiment. 
 
Consequently, the question arises whether Boyle borrowed the experiment from the German alchemist 
and applied it in favor of his own agenda. In the last section (section XL36) of his De nitro and in the 
preface37 (which he completed around 1660 just before its publication) of this work, he tries to 
convince his readers that he had only flipped through Glauber’s book and had executed the 
redintegration experiment long before Glauber. However, as several Boyle scholars have already 
                                                          
36 See WOB, 2, 158. 
37 See WOB, 2, 88-90. 
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argued, he is not trustworthy.  Moreover, as William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe have 
indicated, Boyle had already in other works such as his “The Booke of Nature” (c. 1649) used 
Glauber’s Novi furni (1646-47) as a source. (Newman & Principe 2005, p. 212-213) Furthermore, 
W.R. Newman argues that Boyle is not always “straightforward in the representation of his sources”. 
And Michael Hunter confirms that “literally interpreted”, Boyle is sometimes “somewhat dishonest”.  
(Hunter 2000, p.135-156) 
For several reasons, it is much more likely that Boyle knew about Glauber’s experiment and had used 
it in order to demonstrate the plausibility of his own new philosophy.  This thesis, however, could be 
contested by pointing out that Boyle had indeed published his work indeed in 1661 but had written it 
in the late 1650s38 before Glauber had published his experiment. However, Glauber and Boyle were 
both members of an international network around Samuel Hartlib (ca.1600-1662), the so-called 
Hartlib circle. Consequently, they were in contact with each other via Glauber’s contact person 
Johann Moriaen and other Hartlibians. Hartlib himself was already from 1643 onwards very interested 
in Glauber’s work and even hoped that Glauber would come to England. (Webster 1975) On a regular 
basis, Moriaen sent him Glauber’s writings which he translated and distributed among his members, 
including Robert Boyle. (Young 1998, p.182-216) Not only Glauber’s publications but also his 
equipment was brought to England by Hartlibians and replicated there.  Interestingly, Hartlib wrote in 
1656 already just after the publication of the first parts of the Prosperitatae Germaniae [Teutschlands 
Wolfahrt] that “the annexed discourse of saltpeter De nitro is the most substantial rational et real 
piece, wherein many secrets are discovered which himself [Boyle] had before.”39  Secondly, on the 
demand of Dury and Hartlib himself, another Hartlibian with whom Boyle was in contact, Benjamin 
Worsley (1618-1673), had visited  Glauber’s lab in 1648-49 in Amsterdam.  So, he must have known 
about Glauber’s experiment. Worsley even wrote in the 1650s book entitled, De nitro theses 
quaedam, wherein he described Glauber’s experiments on nitre. Boyle knew this book and was in 
contact with Worsley. Thirdly, Robert Boyle was in 1648, in Holland, at the time Worsley was 
visiting Glauber.  Consequently, it is even likely that - at that moment already being interested in 
chemistry - he might have heard of the activities that took place in Glauber’s impressive lab which 
was at that time not only one of the most well-known labs in Europe but also a discussion room. 
   
b. Glauber’s Paracelsian interpretation  
In Glauber’s times, there was no question yet of modern chemistry.  Therefore, the early chemical 
engineer expressed himself in his numerous writings in technical language referring to practical lab 
skills and applications.  Very remarkably, he made also use of powerful mythological images to 
                                                          
38 See WOB, xii. 
39 HP 29/5/92B.  
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express his views on the redintegration process.  Saltpeter, he writes, is like the Griffin which is a 
non-existing mythological creature with the head of an eagle and the body of a lion.  In 1660 a book 
was published which can be regarded as the first Dutch encyclopedia of animals.  Glauber must have 
had have such an image in mind when he wrote about niter:  
 
Fig.2   A picture of a Griffin, published in 1660 in Amsterdam in the first Dutch encyclopedia of animals.40  
 
The Griffin was traditionally considered to be an especially powerful and majestic mythological 
creature because the lion was traditionally considered the king of the beasts and the eagle the king of 
birds in ancient Persia. In antiquity, it was a symbol of divine power and a guardian of the divine. 
Hence, the early industrial chemist used this mythological figure to express his views on the 
properties of saltpeter which he considered to be fabulous.   
The application of these kind of mythological creatures may sound pre-scientific. However, it is 
interesting to notice that mythological animals such as the Griffon are still used in contemporary 
chemistry to clarify the real structure of substances such as benzene (C6H6).  The real structure is in 
textbooks41 presented as a cross between two non-existing mythological animals. For instance:  A 
rhinoceros (real animal) as a cross between a griffin (imaginary) and a unicorn (imaginary) neither of 
which exists outside of mythology. 
                                                          
40 Picture by the engraver Matthias Merian from: Jonston, John, Naeukeurige beschryving van de natuur der 
viervoetige dieren, vissen en bloedloze water-dieren, vogelen, kronkel-dieren, slangen en draken (Dutch 
translation by M. Grausius of the Historiae naturalis). Amsterdam: I. I. Schipper, 1660. This Dutch translation 
has been published three years after the publication of the original, Latin text.  
41 For an example, see: Chang, Raymond, Physical Chemistry for the Biosciences. Sausalito: University Science 
books, 2005, 466.    
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Fig. 3:  Below: a representation of the real structure of benzene as a combination of the two imaginative 
structures above.   
 
In Glauber’s presentation, the Griffon stands for the “hermaphroditic salt” saltpeter, the eagle for the 
volatile acid spirit of niter and the lion for the fix niter so that the redintegration experiment can be 
represented as follows:  
STEP I:  Griffon (saltpeter) ->   Eagle (Spirit of Niter) + Lion (fix Niter)  
STEP II: Eagle (Spirit of Niter) + Lion (fix Niter)  ->     Griffon   (saltpeter)    
Saltpeter can be transmutated by what he calls “distillation” into “two fightening and capital 
Enemies”: corrosive spirit and fix Salt. The acid spirit of niter does “not dissolve sulphureous 
subjects, but mercurial onely” and “fix niter doth not seize upon mercurial subjects, but sulphureous 
ones”.  It is important to notice that the qualities that Glauber mentions (which make the difference) 
are now both considered to be ‘chemical qualities’: being acid and corrosive, causing substances to 
precipitate, being capable to transmutate different substances, etc. So, Boyle did not introduce the 
supposed ‘chemical qualities’ in his interpretation to give a ‘chemical interpretation’ of the 
phenomenon.  But it is necessary to remark that the distinction between chemical and physical 
qualities is in this historical context quite anachronistic.   
Glauber treats also the second step of the redintegration reaction, the reversed transmutation:  “the 
two enemies” to each other, he continues, can  transmutate again to saltpeter: “which ruinating and 
flaying one another, and being dead, return agen unto that which they were afore, and partakes of both 
natures”.  (Glauber 1689, p. 406) 
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Johann Rudolph Glauber distinguished three different “forms or shapes” of saltpeter as he put it.  The 
author of Novi furni philosophici (1646-47) did not only consider saltpeter to be a compound which 
could be produced starting from waste material.  This material was widely available so that saltpeter 
could subsequently be applied in numerous agricultural and pharmaceutical products in order to 
contribute to the prosperity of Germany after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  Moreover, a 
combination of these three forms constituted, in his view, the universal dissolvent, Van Helmont’s 
Alkahest: “for my part I remain constant in my Opinion, and say, that saltpeter is an universal 
Dissolvent, and is able to dissolve all the things in the whole World, if it be made use of in three 
forms or shaps” (Glauber 1689, p. 406). He described the properties of saltpeter not only in his 
Prosperitatae Germaniae but also in other works he published earlier (e.g. Miraculum Mundi (1653-
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Fig. 4:  Images included in Glauber’s Miraculum Mundi (1653-1658), giving an impression of his lab. (Glauber 
1689, 188) 
 
c. Boyle’s “truly Philosophic and perfect Analysis of Niter” 
As I have shown, Boyle made basically the same conclusion as Glauber. Nevertheless, there are very 
important differences between Glauber’s interpretation and Boyle’s. Glauber explained the 
redintegration process by making use of imaginative metaphors, and a distinction between the three 
forms of salt-peter based on Paracelsus’s three alchemical principles sulphur, mercury, and salt.   
As Clericuzio writes in his Elements, Principles and Corpuscles (2000): Glauber “made no use of 
corpuscular theories in his chemical work”. Boyle, by contrast, gave an intelligible systematical 
interpretation within the conceptual framework of his corpuscular philosophy; that’s why he called the 
redintegration process a “Philosophical Redintegration” opposed to Glauber’s “Chymical 
Purification”. 
The autodidact Glauber was an extremely skilled practical chemist but he was not a theorist and 
certainly not a corpuscular philosopher. Boyle, by contrast, was exceptionally systematic and was one 
of the first to formulate and practice a method of consistent skepticism and experimental verification, 
as J.T. Young put it (Young 1998, p. 185). 
As Boyle had explained in the preface of his De nitro (and also later, for instance in Of the 
Imperfecion of the Chymist’s Doctrine of Qualities) he wanted to get rid of the chemistry based on 
Paracelsus’s ideas. Therefore, he gave Glauber’s experiment and the phenomena that went together 
with that experiment a mechanical interpretation. In conclusion, he used the experiment of ‘the 
Paracelsus of the seventeenth century’ to illustrate and promote his new corpuscular philosophy.  
 
d. Spinoza’s interpretation  
 
Opposed to Boyle and Glauber, Spinoza argued that during the redintegration process saltpeter was 
not analyzed into two different substances which differed fundamentally from saltpeter and from each 
other:  
STEP 1 :       Salt-petre (nitre) [Nitri] -> volatile nitre [Spiritus Nitri] + fixed nitre [salis fixi] 
             STEP 2 :      Volatile nitre [Spiritus Nitri] + fixed nitre [salis fixi] -> Salt-petre (nitre) [Nitri] 
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By contrast, the Dutch philosopher concluded that Nitri and Spiritus nitri were only different states of 
one and the same compound. In his view, the only difference between saltpeter and spirit of nitre is 
that the parts of saltpeter are at rest, whereas the parts of volatile nitre are in motion. Furthermore, as 
he argues, fixed saltpeter is not a significant part of nitre, but an impurity [Foeces Nitri]. Instead of 
being a compound that plays an active role in the experimental transformation, he insists that it is only 
an ‘instrumentum’ [tanquam instrumentum adhibetur], which is comparable to what we know today 
as a catalyst (i.e. a compound that facilitates a reaction without directly participating in or being 
altered by it). In sum, Spinoza gives a mechanical interpretation of the experiment which lead 
Clericuzio to conclude that Spinoza is a radical and strict, reductionistic mechanical philosopher. This 
straightforward conclusion, however, can be contested in several ways.  First of all, how can we 
possibly explain that the Dutch philosopher had - even later in his career, when his philosophy was in 
a more developed stage - a genuine interest in the alchemical question of the transmutation of metals 
if he was a strict mechanical philosopher who excluded all ‘chemical’ transformations from one 
compound into another?  Based on his Letter 40 (1667) to Jarig Jelles, there is historical evidence that 
Spinoza took the alchemist’s claim that silver and lead could be transmuted into gold seriously; that 
he discussed this question with his friends, that he visited alchemists such as the goldsmith Berchtolt 
(or Berchtelt) and Helvetius to figure out whether what he had heard was true.  As Raphael Patai put it 
in his “The Jewish Alchemists” (2014): “This in itself shows that despite his considerable knowledge 
of the sciences and his great critical acumen, Spinoza, a man of his time, considered transmutation at 
least a possibility.” (Patai 2014, p. 398) 
 
Secondly, it cannot be excluded that Spinoza’s interpretation of the experiment does not exclusively 
express his own thoughts but is rather meant to challenge Boyle and find out whether the co-founder 
of the Royal Society could explain the entire phenomenon based on his new mechanical philosophy 
that he defended so proudly. That would explain why, for instance, Spinoza writes in Letter 13 that he 
did not have to prove whether fixed niter is just an impurity in niter. He just assumed this, he clarifies, 
to figure out whether the “Distinguished Gentleman” was able to prove his own interpretation42.  
 
Clericuzio’s conclusion that Spinoza is a reductionistic, strictly radical mechanical philosopher is 
even problematic for other reasons. The term ‘mechanical philosophy’ is not always well defined in 
secondary literature. However, Boyle gave a precise definition which expressed very clearly what his 
contemporaries understood by this term. Obviously, most of the elements (1, 2, 6 and 7) of that 
definition are problematic for Spinoza.  First of all, Boyle’s mechanical principles only apply to the 
corporeal world for Spinoza and not for nature as a whole which in his view implies all existing 
                                                          
42 See CWS, I, 208.  
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things, ideas included. Secondly, as he pointed out in his Letter 81 (1676) to E.W. Tschirnhaus there 
is no passive or inert stuff according to Spinoza. In other words: there is no ‘matter and motion’; there 
is only matter-in-motion or motion-in-matter.  Furthermore, for each body there is a corresponding 
idea, and as Spinoza writes several times in his Ethics: idea and body are one and the same thing. So, 
in that sense, a body can never be reduced to something strictly materialistic. Thirdly, there is the 
machine analogy. Contrary to his contemporaries whose work he knew well such as Chr. Huygens 
and R. Descartes, Spinoza never applies in an explicit way man-made machines such as clocks as an 
analogy for nature as a whole and bodies in particular. Fourthly, there is the epistemic status of 
Boyle’s theory of qualities which - as this paper has shown already - was contested by the Dutch 




This paper has shown that the redintegration experiment - which gets a central place in the comments 
of the Boyle/Spinoza correspondence – must be understood in the light of Boyle’s illustration, defense 
and promotion of a new philosophy: The Corpuscular Philosophy. 
Boyle borrowed an experiment from the German alchemist/chemist Glauber in order to illustrate the 
plausibility of his new philosophy. The author of “The Sceptical Chymist” did not really introduce 
new ‘chemical qualities’ to the substances and drew basically the same conclusion as Glauber. 
However, Boyle interpreted the experiment within another conceptual framework. Boyle expelled the 
influence of Paracelsus and the metaphor of the Griffon from Glauber’s interpretation and gave the 
experiment a mechanical interpretation. This experiment allowed him to demonstrate that saltpeter - 
which he regarded as a paradigmatic example for all substances - could be decomposed and 
recomposed just as a pendulum clock. Contrary to what Clercicuzio writes, Boyle made obvious 
attempts to demonstrate that all the sensible phenomena (or secondary qualities) that went together 
with the experiment could be explained in terms of mechanical properties of the corpuscles.  
Spinoza could hardly believe that it was Boyle’s aim to illustrate his mechanical theory of qualities. 
Therefore, he started to comment on the nature of saltpeter and Boyle ‘s methodology. Contrary to 
what Clericuzio has argued, he did have a problem with Boyle’s experimental methodology, which he 
regarded as unscientific. Instead he preferred ordinary experience as a starting point for adequate 
knowledge. As for the nature of saltpeter, Spinoza contested indeed Boyle’s conclusion that saltpeter 
was recomposed into two different substances which differ from saltpeter.  
However, this may not lead to the straightforward conclusion that Spinoza is a strict mechanical 
philosopher who excluded all transmutations from a body into another body.  It is important to notice 
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that the concept of “affection” between bodies is essential in Spinoza’s ontology and that his system 
allows that a body can be altered into another body. Moreover, as his correspondence illustrates, 
Spinoza took the transmutation of metals very seriously. As this paper has shown, categorizing, 
Spinoza as a reductionistic, radical mechanist, as Clericuzio does, is also for several other reasons 
problematic.     
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